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ABSTRACT
Malware Analysis with Auxiliary-Classifier GAN
by Rakesh Nagaraju
A generative adversarial network (GAN) is a powerful machine learning concept
where both a generative and discriminative model are trained simultaneously. A recent
trend in malware research consists of treating executables as images and employing
image-based analysis techniques. In this research, we generate fake malware images
using GANs, and we also consider the effectiveness of GANs for malware classification.
Specifically, we consider auxiliary classifier GAN (AC-GAN), which enables us to
work with multiclass data. We find that AC-GAN generates malware images that
cannot be reliably distinguished from real malware images. In addition, we find that
the detection capabilities of AC-GAN exceeds other image-based techniques that have
appeared in the literature.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Malware is malicious software that is intentionally designed to do harm. The
potential dangers include access to private data, which in turn can lead to confidential
or financial data theft, identity theft, and many other problems. Those affected by
malware attacks can range from large corporations and government organizations
to a typical computer user. According to McAfee Labs, ‘‘419 malware threats were
encountered per minute in the second quarter of 2020, an increase of almost 12%
over the previous quarter’’ [1]. Malware plays a major role in computer crime and
information warfare, and hence malware research plays a prominent---if not dominant--role in the field of cybersecurity.
A generative adversarial network (GAN) is a powerful machine learning concept
where both a generative and discriminative networks are trained simultaneously [2].
The article [3] proposes a GAN-based model denoted as ‘‘MalGAN’’, which generates
fake malware that the authors claim is undetectable by state-of-the-art techniques.
In [4], MalGAN is extended to ‘‘improved MalGAN’’, which additionally learns benign
features. These MalGAN approaches are trained on a variety of features, including
opcodes. Extraction of opcodes is a relatively costly process. One goal of our research
is to develop techniques comparable to MalGAN and improved MalGAN that are
significantly more efficient.
A recent trend in malware research consists of treating executables as images,
which opens the door to the use of image-based analysis techniques. For example, a
malware detector that uses image features known as ‘‘gist descriptors’’ is considered
in [5]. Other image-based approaches that have been used with success in the malware
domain include convolution neural networks (CNN) and extreme learning machines
(ELM); see [6] and [7], respectively. GANs have previously been studied in the context
1

of malware images. For example, in [8] a transfer learning-based GAN method is
used to classify previously unknown malware (so-called ‘‘zero-day’’ malware). In this
approach, GANs are used to generate realistic fake malware images, which serve to
augment the training data, thereby reducing the required number of training samples.
In this research, we focus on generating realistic fake malware images using GANs,
as well as considering malware classification using these fake images. Specifically, we
use auxiliary classifier GAN (AC-GAN), which enables us to work with multiclass
data. We first convert malware executables from a large and diverse malware datasets
into images. We train AC-GAN models on these images, which enables us to generate
fake malware images corresponding to each family. To determine the quality of these
fake samples, we train various models, including CNNs and ELMs, to distinguish
between the real and fake samples. The performance of these models provide an
indication of the quality of our fake malware images---the worse the models perform,
the better are our fake images. In addition to the generation problem, we experiment
with a wide variety of image-based malware classification techniques, including CNNs
and ELMs, as well as considering discriminative models trained using AC-GANs. In
all cases, we experiment with various combinations of real and fake malware images.
Our ultimate goal is to determine practical use cases for fake malware images.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 covers relevant
previous work. In Chapter 3, we outline the methodologies used in this project. Chapter 4 provides details on the datasets and implementation details. Our experimental
results appear in Chapter 5, while Chapter 6 concludes this paper and includes a
discussion of possible avenues for future work.

2

CHAPTER 2
Background
In this section, some of the previous work related to malware classification using
machine learning techniques are reviewed. The limitations and advantages of these
approaches are analyzed. This literature review answers the following questions: How
efficient is the GAN-based approach in comparison to the deep learning approach?
And how robust is the image-based method compared to the feature selection method
for malware classification? The articles selected for this literature review include
conference proceedings, published papers, thesis, and articles. The rest of this section
is as follows. Section 2.1 presents a comparison between GAN and other deep learning
approaches for malware detection. Section 2.2 compares feature selection process vs
image analysis techniques for classifying malware.
2.1

GAN vs other deep learning techniques for detecting malware
Most popular malware detectors use pattern matching for detection. However,

on altering this pattern, a detector can easily be bypassed [5]. Even statistical and
machine learning-based malware detectors are susceptible to code obfuscation [5].
Hence the problem is to find an efficient and realistic approach that provides good
results along with robustness even in such scenarios. In [9] deep learning techniques
are considered for malware classification. The results from two different experiments
show that deep learning techniques achieves better accuracy than standard malware
detectors [5]. However, these models compromise on efficiency.
Another semisupervised approach is proposed [10]. Here, Santos et al, proposes an
algorithm called ‘‘Learning with Local and Global Consistency’’ to reduce dependency
on the labeled data, by combining both labeled and unlabeled data for training. In [11],
another deep learning model called ‘‘Word2Vec’’ is utilized for malware representation.
Paired with a ‘‘Gradient Search Algorithm’’ this method achieved an accuracy of
3

about 94%. However, both these models use malware executables as input, and thus
the training time is high.
A static malware analysis technique that uses deep learning feed-forward network
is proposed in [12]. Another powerful machine learning concept that can be used in
this context is generative adversarial network (GAN), where both a generative and
discriminative network are trained simultaneously [5, 2]. This was further proved
right in [13], where the author, shows us how GAN can be used to improve malware
classification with deep learning. T. Klimek et al. in their paper states that ‘‘GAN is
the next big thing in machine learning’’ [2]. The article [3] proposes a GAN-based
model, denoted as ‘‘MalGAN’’, that generates fake malware, which the authors claim is
undetectable by state-of-the-art techniques. In [4], MalGAN is extended to ‘‘improved
MalGAN’’, which additionally learns benign features. These approaches were trained
on a variety of features, including opcodes. Experiments in [14] successfully show that
deep convolution GAN can be used to enable training with fewer data, while in [8],
authors Y. Lu at el. use deep learning GAN models that are capable of producing good
quality images. The images generated by these GAN based approaches are at random,
however, in [15] conditional based GAN is used that produce results comparable
to other previous approaches, while additionally providing control over the image
generation. One problem, in this case, is that the discriminator model, cannot be used
to classify the sample labels, as the labels are passed as a parameter to this model.
Therefore, we can say that among the existing deep learning models, GAN is good
models to generate malware and also efficient. However, better research is required to
make use of the complete capability that GAN offers, while achieving good results.

4

2.2

Using feature selection vs image analysis techniques for malware classification
Approaches in [3, 4] are trained on a variety of features, including opcodes. In [3],

W. Hu at el. builds a substitute detector using neural networks called black-box
detectors, and samples are generated by considering features of malware such as
opcodes. The extraction and processing of opcodes is a relatively costly process.
A recent trend in malware research consists of treating executables as images,
which opens the door to the use of image-based analysis techniques. In [16], authors
Nataraj et al. explains in detail a procedure to convert executable binary files into
grayscale images. Conti et al. in their paper first analyzed malware as images.
They analyzed patterns in malware as images and divided them into sections. They
conclude that code is represented in ‘‘.text’’ section, initialized and uninitialized
code are contained in the ‘‘.data’’ section, and executables are located in the ‘‘.rsrc’’
section [17] of a malware image. A malware detector that uses malware image features
known as ‘‘gist descriptors’’ is described in [5]. The experiments in [5], were performed
on MalImg data set and Malicia data set, where the classification accuracy achieved
between opcodes and images are same, however, the processing time reduced when
treating malware as images. This is because, feature reduction and analysis are not
required, thus making malware image techniques more robust.
Deep learning techniques like recurrent neural networks (RNN) and ‘‘Convolutional Neural Networks’’ (CNN) were applied in [18] to generate malware images.
They utilized a combination of the static analysis of malicious code to generate these
images. Then, they applied an abstract representation technique to the image, that
computes the important features and classifies malware. Good accuracies are observed
in this approach, which further supports the claim of using malware as images. Other
image-based approaches like CNN and extreme learning machine (ELM) have been
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used with success in the malware domain see [6] and [7], respectively. Therefore, we
can say that in comparison to feature selection, treating malware as images can reduce
the computation time.
With the inclusion of machine learning in malware detection, there will be
an increase in efficiency in the field of security. The literature agrees that image
descriptors with deep learning models successfully detect malware and are more robust
than feature extraction methods. Also, GAN is known to work well with images.
However, additional control is needed in using GAN while not compromising on GAN
capabilities. Therefore, we can conclude that further research is required in finding an
approach to use image analysis techniques with GAN.
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CHAPTER 3
Methodology
This section outlines the working of this project. The goal of this project is to
create realistic looking fake malware images. We achieve this using GAN, in particular
AC-GAN. Original malware images are fed through AC-GAN, which while training
learns to generate fake malware as well as distinguish them. Once, we generate these
malware images, then we will analyze the quality of these images. The rest of this
section is as follows: Section 3.1 describes the data set used. Section 3.2 briefs about
AC-GAN and its working. Section 3.3 outlines the methods used to validate the
quality of the fake malware images.
3.1

Dataset
The data set required for this project needs malware as images. Therefore, we

are using two types of data set in this project: MalImg, which contains 9,786 malware
images belonging to 25 classes obtained from [16]. and MalExe, which contains 24,558
malware executable files belonging to 18 classes obtained from [19]. MalExe data set is
a collection of executables obtained samples from Malicia data set (Winwebsec, Zbot,
Zeroaccess) and [20]. Since these files are executable binary files, we are converting
these binaries to images, similar to experiments in [16, 6]. The malware family name
and description for MalImg and MalExe can be seen in the Table 1 and Table 2
respectively.
Figure 1 shows the image of ‘‘Adialer.C’’ family from the MalImg data set, and
Figure 2 shows for ‘‘Obfuscator’’ family from the MalExe data set. The rest of the
images for all classes are mentioned in the Appendix A.2 and A.1. Both these data
sets are open source and are available online. Before we perform experiments on this
data set, we preprocess and transform the data. In the Section 4.1.2, we see in detail
the functions adopted for pre processing.
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Table 1: Details about the malware families for MalExe data set
Family
Alureon
BHO
CeeInject
Cycbot
DelfInject
FakeRean
Hotbar
Lolyda.BF
Obfuscator
OnLineGames
Rbot
Renos
Startpage
Vobfus
Vundo
Winwebsec
Zbot
Zeroaccess

Type
Trojan
Trojan
VirTool
Backdoor
VirTool
Rogue
Adware
Password Stealer
VirTool
Password Stealer
Backdoor
Trojan Downloader
Trojan
Worm
Trojan Downloader
Rogue
Password Stealer
Trojan Horse

Information
provides access to confidential data [21].
performs malicious activities [22].
obfuscated code performs any actions [23].
provides control of a system to a server [24].
provides access to sensitive information [25].
raises false vulnerabilities [26].
displays ads on browsers [27].
monitors and sends user’s network activity [28].
obfuscated code, hard to detect [29].
acquires login information of online games [30].
provides control of a system [31].
raises false warnings [32].
change browser homepage/ other malicious actions [33].
download malware and spreads it through USB [34].
downloads malware using pop-up ads [35].
raises false vulnerabilities [36].
steals personal information through spam emails [37].
downloads malware on host machines [38].

Figure 1: Adialer.C from MalImg data set
3.2

Auxiliary-Classifier GAN (AC-GAN)
Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) is a deep convolutional neural network

model that is capable of generating a fake image as described in [15]. GAN is mainly
composed of two types of network models: a generator model, and a discriminative
model. The generator generates images by plotting random points from latent space.
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Table 2: Details about the malware families for MalImg data set
Family
Adialer.C
Agent.FYI
Allaple.A
Allaple.L
Alureon.gen!J
Autorun.K
C2LOP.gen!g
C2LOP.P
Dialplatform.B
Dontovo.A
Fakerean
Instantaccess
Lolyda.AA1
Lolyda.AA2
Lolyda.AA3
Lolyda.AT
Malex.gen!J
Obfuscator.AD
Rbot!gen
Skintrim.N
Swizzor.gen!E
Swizzor.gen!I
VB.AT
Wintrim.BX
Yuner.A

Type
Dialer
Backdoor
Worm
Worm
Trojan
Worm:AutoIT
Trojan
Trojan
Dialer
Trojan downloader
Rogue
Dialer
PWS
PWS
PWS
PWS
Trojan
Trojan Downloader
Backdoor
Trojan
Trojan downloader
Trojan downloader
Worm
Trojan downloader
Worm

Information
perform malicious activities [39].
exploits DNS server service [40].
performs DoS attacks [41].
worm that spreads itself [42].
modifies DNS settings [43].
worm that spreads itself [44].
changes browser settings [45].
modifies bookmarks, popup adds [46].
automatically dials high premium numbers [47].
download and execute arbitrary files [48].
pretends to scan, but steals data [26].
drops trojan to system [49].
steals sensitive information [50].
steals sensitive information [50].
steals sensitive information [50].
steals sensitive information [51].
allows hacker to perform desired actions [52].
allows hacker to perform desired actions [53].
allows hacker to perform desired actions [54].
allows hacker to perform desired actions [55].
downloads and installs unwanted software [56].
downloads and installs unwanted software [57].
spreads automatically across machines [58].
download and install other software [59].
spreads automatically across machines [60].

Next, the discriminator models classify the generated image by comparing it with
the original image. It tells the generator how far the fake image is from the original
image. Based on this knowledge the generator tries to improve itself and generate
a better looking image in the next epoch. This is the same as finding a solution to
a zero-sum game. With enough iterations and training, we will be able to generate
realistic looking fake images.
However, if we are dealing with multi-class data, then working with GAN is not
feasible. The reason is that the images generated by GAN are randomized, we cannot
choose what image we want to generate. But ideally, we want control over the class
9

Figure 2: Obfuscator from MalExe data set
of images generated. To achieve this, we use ‘‘Auxiliary-Classifier’’ GAN (AC-GAN),
which is similar to GAN, and works very well in synthesizing images. Given a class
label, AC-GAN can plot an image of that class, on a latent space with just noise.
Additionally, the discriminator can predict both the class label name and the validity
(real/ fake). A schematic representation of AC-GAN can be in the Figure 3. Using
AC-GAN, we gain control of the class of the image we want to generate.
The transformed data obtained from Section 3.1 will be divided to train and test
data. The AC-GAN is trained using the train data set. To test the accuracy of the
model, we will first generate images using the generator model. Both the generated
images and the test data set are fed as input to the discriminator. The discriminator
will predict two outputs. One is whether if the malware is real/ fake, and the other is
the family of the malware. We also measure the accuracy of these predictions.
3.3

Evaluation plan
Once, we have trained and tested our AC-GAN model, we now need to evaluate

the images. By evaluating the images, we will know how well our model has trained. To
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Figure 3: Schematic representation of AC-GAN
do this, we use both sets of real and fake images as stated in the test plan in Section 3.2.
We compare our model performance with ML models such as ‘‘Convolutional Neural
Network’’ (CNN), ‘‘Extreme Learning Machine’’ (ELM), by varying cases of data.
3.3.1

Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)

CNN works very similar how a human brain perceives an image. It recognizes
shapes and corresponding edges to identify objects. CNN is a feed-forward network
that is made up of: a ‘‘fully-connected layer’’, where all inputs from previous layers are
come together to form the output layer, a ‘‘Convolution layer’’, which takes the input
and applies filter, based on stride to produce a feature map. Matrix multiplication is
applied to calculate the values by the filter. This layer is then followed by a ‘‘Pooling
11

layer’’, which downscales the previous layer output, by dividing it into sections and
selecting the maximum value. The architecture of CNN’s can be seen in the Figure 4.

Figure 4: Schematic representation of CNN
For our experiments, we will be using the CNN model with parameters as specified
in [6], as the experiments performed in this paper also use malware images and has
proven that CNN works well with this data set.
3.3.2

Extreme Learning Machine (ELM)

ELM is a Machine learning algorithm that does not have back-propagation, like
other machine learning models. The weights and biases are assigned at random and
weights are calculated once. Thus, with ELMs, the training time is reduced, making
the algorithm very efficient. ELMs containa an initial input layer, a final output layer,
and an in between hidden layer. The only parameter an ELM calculates is ‘‘Beta’’.
Given a problem, a unique solution is found by calculating Moore-Penrose generalized
inverse. The schematic representation of ELM can be seen in the Figure 5.
For our experiments, we will be using ELM model with parameters as specified
in [6], as the experiments performed in this paper also use malware images and have
proven that ELM works well with this data set.
In order to evaluate the quality of the generated images, we first divide the real/
fake images among the test and train data set. Next, we train both CNN and ELM
on the training data set. Once, the training is completed, we predict class labels
12

Figure 5: Schematic representation of ELM
on test data set for CNN and ELM. If the accuracy of these two models converges
to about 50%, then it means that both these model even after training is unable to
distinguish from real and fake samples. Then we can successfully conclude that the
quality of the images generated by our AC-GAN is very close to the original images.
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CHAPTER 4
Implementation
In this section, we see in detail the implementation of the methodology discussed
in Section 3. This project is implemented in Python using PyTorch, keras modules,
and was run on ‘‘Google Colab Pro’’ and a ‘‘Windows’’ system. The specification and
requirements to run the code are given in the Table 3.
Table 3: Software Specifications
Specification
Windows OS
Processor
RAM
GPU
pyTorch
keras
numpy
Scipy
PIL
Google Colab Pro
Available runtime
Memory
GPU

Description
Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-9750H CPU @ 2.60GHz
16.0 GB or higher
NVIDIA GeForce RTX 2060; 14GB
installed
installed
installed
installed
installed
24 hours
25.0 GB with high memory
T4 and P100

The rest of this section is as follows: Section 4.1 provides information on data set
analysis and pre-processing. Section 4.2 explains the AC-GAN implementation and
training procedures. Section 4.3 discusses on implementation of testing and evaluation
methods.
4.1

Dataset analysis and conversion
We are using two different datasets for this project. For both cases, we use

ImageDataGenerator and Dataloader from keras, and PyTorch modules to extract
images and labels from the data set. Additionally we will use transforms functions
to compose our pre-processing requirement. Let us look into these implementations in
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more detail.
4.1.1

Data analysis

The MalImg data set was first described in [61], and it contain 9339 images.
These images are grayscale and belong to 25 classes. The MalExe data set is a set
of executable malware files and contain 24,558 malware belonging to 18 classes. For
resizing the images in MalImg data set, we specify the target size while loading the
images using tranforms function.
Since the MalExe files are executable binary files, we are converting these binaries
to images, similar to experiments in [61]. We first read desired bytes of malware
binaries such that the bytes round off to desired image size. Next, we reshape the
single vector into 2D vector of desired (height and width) and save the file as a ‘‘.png’’
image. In Figure 6, 7, we see three images sizes for family ‘‘Alureon’’. Figure 6 shows
512 × 512 converted image that is available, another image of standard size image,
and 128 × 128 converted image obtained by reading only 16384 bytes. In Figure 7,
64 × 64 images is represented obtained by reading 4096 bytes and 32 × 32 images.

Figure 6: 512 × 512, standard image, 128 × 128 conversion
From these images, we can see that as the dimension reduces, the image clarity
also diminishes. This is because only fewer data bytes have been considered for image
conversion. In order to generate higher dimension images, we will pad additional bytes
of 0 to the malware binaries before converting them to image. In Table 4, we see
the image count obtained for the MalExe data set for various sizes. We can see here
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Figure 7: 64 × 64, 32 × 32 image conversion
that for 512 × 512 image only 9963 files for 17 classes. For the family ‘‘zeroaccess’’,
no image of this size is available. Therefore, if we want to consider only bigger size
images, then we will have to compromise on the size of the data set.
Table 4: MalExe data set count on various image size conversion.
Size
Standard (round to nearest square)
512 × 512
128 × 128
64 × 64
32 × 32

Count
24,652
9,963
23,369
24,371
24,557

Families
18
17
18
18
18

Once, the data is obtained, we load the 2D image vector and class names from
the root path using DataLoader function,. Next, we check the class indices, to map
the class label to value. For example: ‘‘Alureon’’ will be mapped to 0, ‘‘Bho’’ will be
mapped to 1 and so on for all the existing classes. Next, we check the distribution
of data for all classes. To achieve this, we first calculate the percentage of a class
among all the given classes. Then, we plot a bar graph using matplotlib for classes
vs percentage we calculated above for each family. The results can be seen in the
Figure 10.
We can see from the graph that for MalImg, the majority of the images belong to
‘‘Allaple.A’’, ‘‘Allaple.L’’, and ‘‘Yuner.A’’. To combat these inaccuracies, we shuffle
the data during training and use ‘‘balanced’’ accuracy while testing. Also, for MalExe
16

Figure 8: Distribution of the data set among all classes MalImg (on left), MalExe (on
right)
data set, the data distribution is more even and the majority of the images belong to
‘‘winwebsec’’, and ‘‘vundo’’. Therefore, we can conclude that the data in MalImg is
highly imbalanced, while the data in MalExe is not so imbalanced.
4.1.2

Data pre-processing

Next, for pre-processing the data we are using Python, PyTorch, keras, PIL
libraries. We first convert the images to desired height and width (say 32 × 32, 64 × 64,
128 × 128). Now we first convert the images 2D vector values into numpy array. Then,
we need to bring the pixel values of each image to a common range of values. We
achieve this by calculating the ‘‘mean image’’ and subtract each image value with the
mean value, thus obtaining values in the range (-1, 1). Next, we convert every value
type to np.float32. Also, since both the datasets contain around 9k and 24k images,
we divide them into batches before beginning our training. Each batch now contains
a tuple (images, labels) where the image is a 2D float tensor and labels are the class
label indices.
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4.2

AC-GAN implementation
In this section, we implement the AC-GAN model using Python, PyTorch and

keras modules as in [62]. We also make use of the available GPU runtime, to make
our training and processing faster. Let us look at each implementation in detail.
4.2.1

Generator

The generator generates a single channel grayscale image by plotting random
points from latent space. It additionally takes the class label as a parameter. Therefore,
we begin generator, as a sequential model and we later add a series of deconvolutional
layers.
First, we initialize a linear layer with the quarter of the required image size and
latent space. Next, we build the deconvolution layer that comprises of: Upsample
function to upsample the image with scale factor of 2, and Conv2D layers. In
between theses layers, we apply batch normalization with momentum 0.8, and
LeakyReLU activation layer. Finally, we add a Tanh() activation function that
calculate the final image values.
During the forward pass, we combine the initializing layer with embedded class
values. Next, we reshape this tensor and pass it through the deconvolution layers to
generate images of desired class and size.
The parameters used for the generator can be seen in the Table 5.
4.2.2

Discriminator

The discriminator model discriminates between the original and fake images while
predicting the class label. It tells the generator how far the fake image is from the
original image.
To achieve this, we first create a block that is a Conv2D layer with input filter
size, output filter size, and non-linear LeakyRelu with dropout rate set to ‘‘0.25’’.
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Table 5: AC-GAN generator construction parameters
No
layer-embed
l1
(0)
Convolution-blocks
(0)
(1)
(2)

Layers
Embedding()
Sequential()
Linear()
Sequential()
BatchNormal2d()
Upsample()
Conv2d()

(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

BatchNormal2d()
LeakyReLU()
Upsample()
Conv2d()

(7)
(8)
(9)

BatchNormal2d()
LeakyReLU()
Conv2d()

(10)

Tanh()

Parameters
classLabels × 100
in-features = 100; out-features = 131,
in = 128; momentum = 0.1
Scale factor = 2.0
in = 128; out = 128; kernel = (3,3);
stride = (1,1); padding = (1,1)
in = 128; momentum = 0.1
negativeslope = 0.2
Scale factor = 2.0
in = 128; out = 64; kernel = (3,3);
stride = (1,1); padding = (1,1)
in = 64; momentum = 0.1
negativeslope = 0.2
in = 64; outchannels = 1; kernel = (3,3);
stride = (1,1); padding = (1,1)
Scale factor = 2.0

Now, to build the discriminator, we add this block with desired input and output
filter sizes. For Conv2D layer we set kernel size to 3 and the number of strides to 2.
Now, we downsample the image and pass it through two different layers to generate
two outputs. One is the auxiliary linear layer with softmax for detecting the class
names. Other is a adversarial layer with sigmoid function for identifying its validity.
We are using 2 loss functions in AC-GAN namely BinaryCrossentropy to produces
binary output (0 or 1), and SparseCategoricalCrossentropy to predict numerical
class values.
The

generator

and

discriminator,

SparseCategoricalCrossentropy loss.

both

try

to

maximize

the

The generator attempts to minimize

BinaryCrossentropy loss and fool the discriminator while the discriminator tries
to maximize this loss. The optimizer used in all these experiments is Adam. The
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parameters used in the discriminator can be seen in the Table 6.
Table 6: AC-GAN discriminator construction parameters

No
Convolution-blocks
(0)

Layers
Sequential()
Conv2d()

(1)
(2)
(3)

LeakyReLU()
Dropout2d()
Conv2d()

(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

LeakyReLU()
Dropout2d()
BatchNormal2d()
Conv2d()

(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)

LeakyReLU()
Dropout2d()
BatchNormal2d()
Conv2d()

(12)
(13)
(14)
Adversarial-layer
(0)
(1)
Auxiliary-layer
(0)
(1)

LeakyReLU()
Dropout2d()
BatchNormal2d()
Sequential()
Linear()
Sigmoid()
Sequential()
Linear()
Sigmoid()

4.2.3

Parameters
in = 1; out = 16; kernel = (3,3);
stride = (2,2); padding = (1,1)
negativeslope = 0.2
rate = 0.25
in = 16; out = 32; kernel = (3,3);
stride = (2,2); padding = (1,1)
negativeslope = 0.2
rate = 0.25
in = 32; momentum = 0.1
in = 32; out = 64; kernel = (3,3);
stride = (2,2); padding = (1,1)
negativeslope = 0.2
rate = 0.25
in = 64; momentum = 0.1
in = 64; out = 128; kernel = (3,3);
stride = (2,2); padding = (1,1)
negativeslope = 0.2
rate = 0.25
in = 128; momentum = 0.1
in-features = 8192; out-features = 1

in-features = 8192; out-features = 18

Training

Once, we have built the generator and discriminator model, now we need to train
the model. For this, we first load the data set and pre process it as seen in Section 4.1.
Next, we initialize the ground truth value for validity (0 for real and 1 for fake), we
initialize loss output to zeros. Now we start the epoch as set by the user, with the
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default value set as 1000. In every epoch we follow the following steps:
1. Select a random index and using that index, select a random batch of images.
2. Generate initial noise required for the generator input.
3. Select random labels called ‘‘sample labels’’ based on the index for the generator
to generate an image.
4. Then,

generate half of the batch size of fake images using the

generator.predict() function.
5. Label the fake class of images as 0 and valid images as 1. These are called
adversarial values.
6. Now, train the generator, by generating random images and then using discriminator to predict the validity and class labels. Based on these values, we
calculate the generator loss using two loss functions and later averaging both
these values.
7. With the generator calculated, we update the weights of generator using step()
and backward().
8. Next, we train the discriminator, first we set the gradient to zero. We train
discriminator on both real and fake images and calculate losses. The final
discriminator loss is the average of these two losses.
9. Finally, we update the weights of discriminator based on this loss value using
step() and backward().
We additionally calculate and display the accuracy of the discriminator using
predictions from the previous step. At certain intervals in the training, we also
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generate and save sample images of a different class. We also print both their loss
values at every epoch. Once training is done, we save the trained model and store the
losses from every epoch. We plot graphs using these values to visualize the stability
of training.
4.3

Evaluation models implementation
Once trained, we now need to evaluate the model. First, we plot graphs with the

losses stored, to check the training stability, using Python and matplotlib library.
Next, we implement CNN and ELM and run various experiments with different cases
of real and fake data samples.
4.3.1

CNN implementation

CNN contains a fully-connected layer, a convolution layer, and a pooling layer.
To implement this, we use a Sequential layer, and add on additional layers to this
model. First, we create a convolution layer with Conv2D with the image input shape.
We set the kernel to 3, and use relu activation function. Next, we add a pooling
layer, implemented using MaxPooling2D with pool size 2 and dropout rate 0.25. The
image input is passed through these layers and is then flattened and fed to the final
layer. The fully connected layer is implemented using Dense layer with softmax
activation function. It predicts multiclass labels. The loss function used in this model
is categorical crossentropy loss with Adam optimizer. We also use ‘‘balanced’’
accuracy to measure the correct accuracy as the data set is imbalanced. The parameters
used in this implementation are specified in Table 7.
The implementation is as specified in [63]. Using this model, we perform different
cases of testing with real and fake images to evaluate our AC-GAN model.
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Table 7: CNN construction parameters
No
CNN
(0)

Layers
Sequential()
Conv2d()

(1)
(0)

MaxPooling2D()
Conv2d()

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(4)
(4)

MaxPooling2D()
Dropout()
Flatten()
Dense()
Dropout()
Dense()
Dense()
Loss
Optimizer

4.3.2

Parameters
filters = 30; in = image-size; out = 840;
kernel = (3,3); activation = ‘‘relu’’
size = (2,2)
filters = 15; in = 840; out = 4065;
kernel = (3,3); activation = ‘‘relu’’
size = (2,2)
rate = 0.25
units = 128; out = 376,448; activation = ‘‘relu’’
rate = 0.5
units = 50; out = 6450; activation = ‘‘relu’’
units = num-of-classes; activation = ‘‘softmax’’
categorical cross entropy
Adam

ELM implementation

ELM contains an initial input layer, final output layer and a in between hidden
layer. First, we generate random input weights for the hidden layer using Python
random module. We then calculate ‘‘hidden layer to output’’ weights, as a dot product
of ‘‘input’’ and ‘‘input-to-hidden layer’’ weights. To these weights, we apply ReLu
activation function.
Next, we compute output weights, by calculating the dot product of transposed
‘‘input to hidden’’ layer value with actual ‘‘input to hidden’’ layer value. We calculate
the multiplicative inverse of this value using np.lingalg.iv. Next, we calculate the
dot product of transposed ‘‘input to hidden’’ layer value with class labels and finally
return its dot product with the multiplicative inverse value. We set the number of
hidden units to be large. Next, we define a function to predict the output labels. We
calculate the dot product of the output from the ‘‘input to hidden’’ layer, and the
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output weights, to return the class label. Finally, we test our model by comparing
the prediction values with the original class values. For all our experiments, we will
be using implementation as specified in [64]. In Section 5, we discuss in detail the
results obtained from these implementations.

24

CHAPTER 5
Results
Here, we generate images of various sizes and plot graphs to analyze the training
and the discriminator accuracy. We also evaluate the quality of these images against
CNN and ELM. Finally, we summarize and discuss these results. Section 5.1 discusses
the results obtained from AC-GAN. Section 5.2 analyzes the evaluates fake images on
CNN and ELM. Section 5.3 discusses and summarizes the overall results.
5.1

Results from AC-GAN
Here, we look at the results generated images of three different sizes as well as the

discriminator accuracies. We plot losses graph to analyze training along the way. In
Section 5.1.1, we generate 64 × 64 size images, and in Section 5.1.2 we concentrate on
32 × 32 images. Finally, in Section 5.1.3, we look to train model to generate 128 × 128
size images.
Table 8: AC-GAN discriminator Accuracy
Image Size
32 × 32
32 × 32
64 × 64
64 × 64
128 × 128
128 × 128

5.1.1

Data set used
MalImg
MalExe
MalImg
MalExe
MalImg
MalExe

Accuracy
95%
89.2%
93.79%
88%
92%
85%

Results for 64 × 64

To generate 64 × 64 image, first we initialize the image size parameter in AC-GAN
model to 64. The rest parameters are kept mentioned in Section 4.2 and we train the
model. For MalImg data set, the model is trained for 1000 epochs with 50 batch size.
Around 9k images will be divided among 50 batches, which gives us 187 images per
batch. Therefore, our model is trained for about 18,700 iterations.
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For the MalExe data set, the model is trained for 450 epochs with 50 batch
size. 24,371 images will be divided among 50 batches, which gives us 492 images per
batch. Therefore, our model is trained for about 221,400 iterations.
Training time for each data set takes about 24 hours of training time when ran on
‘‘Google Colab Pro’’. During each epoch, we store the generator loss and discriminator
losses, and once done, we plot a graph using these losses to visualize the stability
of the model. Figure 9 and Figure 10 shows the training loss plots for MalImg and
MalExe respectively.

Figure 9: Loss plot for AC-GAN on MalImg

Figure 10: Loss plot for AC-GAN on MalExe
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From Figure 9, we can see that, there is a spike in losses during the initial
training, which eventually stabilizes around 250 epoch. The initial spikes are due
to the fact that AC-GAN tries to generate an image from noise, but it has barely
learned anything to generate a correct image. The discriminator is trying to predict a
class for this noise image. Hence, the losses are high. The generator loss eventually
stabilizes to around 1.2 to 3.5, and the discriminator to about 1.3 to 2.0. Table 8
shows the average accuracy of 95% obtained on the data on all batches. This shows
that the discriminator model is stable, but the generator is still learning. The losses
are reducing with increase in epochs, so with more training, the losses reduce further.
Therefore, we can say that our model is stabilizing with a gradual decrease in losses
and additional training is required to see if the losses decrease any further.
In Figure 10, we see that during the initial training losses about 3.25 for generator
and about 2 for discriminator, but eventually stabilizes to around 1.5 to 2 for generator
and 1.25 to 1.75 for the discriminator. Table 8 shows the average accuracy of 89.2%.
The training is more stable in this case than the previous one, though the model was
run only for 450 epochs. The losses are in the expected range and hence we can say
that the model is stable. One factor for high losses might be the nature of AC-GAN.
It is a highly complex model that looks to train two models simultaneously. In such
scenarios, instability tends to occur in one of the models.
Next, we use the generator models from both experiments to generate images. We
generate 100 images for every family of malware, and store them for further evaluation.
Figure 11 shows the comparison between real and fake images of class ‘‘Lolyda.AA3
’’, and ‘‘Agent.FYI’’ for the MalImg data set.
In Figure 11, we can see that for both the families, the fake images look very
similar to the originals. Both the images for MalImg are nearly identical to the original
ones. Thus, we can say that though the losses graph for MalImg is not ideal, the
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Figure 11: Lolyda.AA3 (on left) and Agent.FYI (on right) from MalImg

Figure 12: Zbot (on left) and Vobfus (on right) from MalExe
images generated by the generator are visually very accurate.
Figure 12 shows the comparison between real and fake images of class ‘‘Zbot’’,
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and ‘‘Vobfus’’for the MalExe data set. Here, we can see that there is some pattern
generated in fake images, however, there are not a look alike copy of the original
images. One reason for this could be the presence of many variants for a particular
malware class. GAN generates images, by deriving patterns, statistical in a data set,
and since our data contains variants, the generated image may be a combination of
different patterns of all variants of a single family. Another reason could be that many
different classes in MalExe contain identical images, and because of less training, the
model is generating such images. This, AC-GAN model for MalExe has trained for 450
epochs, and for data that contains around 24k images, the model requires much more
training. However, with the resources available, only about 450 epochs were possible
for this experiment.
5.1.2

Results for 32 × 32

Similar to experiments in Section 5.1.1, our objective here is generate and classify
images of size 32 × 32. For MalImg images, we resize them to 32. There are 9k images
in this data set. We train the model for 1000 epochs with 100 batch size. Therefore
we have 94 images per batch, which sums up to about 94000 iterations.
For MalExe data set we read first 1024 bytes from the binaries, and reshape them
to 32 × 32 size image. Next, we begin the training.
We train this model for 500 epochs with 50 batch size. 24,557 images will be
divided among 50 batches. Therefore, we have 492 image per batch and our model is
trained for about 246,000 iterations. Both these experiments take about 24 hours of
run time on ‘‘Google Colab Pro’’. Figure 13 and Figure 14 shows the training loss
plots for MalImg and MalExe respectively.
From Figure 13, we can see that the initial losses are around 4 for generator
and 2.0 for discriminator. However, as we can see both the generator and discriminator
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Figure 13: Loss plot for AC-GAN on MalImg

Figure 14: Loss plot for AC-GAN on MalExe
stabilizes around epoch 100. The generator spikes up to 2.5 to 3.0 occasionally but
has stable loss values around 2.0 to 2.2. The discriminator loss is in the range 1.4
to 1.8 throughout. Table 8 shows the average accuracy of 93.79%. This shows that
the model is stable during training. Figure 10, also shows a similar pattern with odd
spikes in the generator loss of about 12, and average loss around range 3.5 to 6.0.
The discriminator is stable throughout with losses in range 1.0 to 4.0 with average
accuracy of 88% as seen in Table 8. The high loss range of the generator tells us that
it is trying to learn more information in every epoch.
Figure 15 shows a comparison of real and fake images for families ‘‘C2LOP.P’’
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and ‘‘Allaple.L’’ from MalImg data set. Figure 16 shows a comparison between real
and fake images for ‘‘Alureon’’ and ‘‘Zeroaccess’’ from MalExe data. Visually the
images in Figure 16 are almost identical and the images in Figure 15 are similar.
Therefore we can conclude that in this section the AC-GAN model for MalExe has
trained well and further training is required for the MalImg AC-GAN model.

Figure 15: C2LOP.P and Allaple.L from MalImg

Figure 16: Alureon and Zeroaccess from MalExe
One use of generating 32×32 is that processing required in training these models is
less when compared to larger size image generation models. However, one disadvantage
is that since the image size is small, visually it is hard to distinguish between real and
fake. And on enhancing the image, it becomes pixelated. Therefore, we can conclude
that small size images can be generated only when there are processing constraints. If
we need to generate a visually appealing image, then a better idea would be to a large
size image.
5.1.3

Results for 128 × 128

Here, we set AC-GAN image size parameter to 128. For MalImg images, we
directly resize the image to 128. The model is trained for 1000 epochs with 50 batch
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size. 9339 images will be divided among 50 batches, which gives us 187 images per
batch and about 18,700 iterations in total.
For MalExe data, we directly read the first 16,384 bytes from the binaries, and
reshape them to 128 × 128 image. This converted MalExe data set, contains 23,369
images for 18 families. The model is trained for 450 epochs with 50 batch size, which
gives us 492 images per batch which gives us about 221400 iterations that take about 24
hours to run on ‘‘Google Colab Pro’’. Figure 17 and Figure 18 shows the training loss
plots for MalImg and MalExe respectively.

Figure 17: Loss plot for AC-GAN on MalImg

Figure 18: Loss plot for AC-GAN on MalExe
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Figure 18, shows that the discriminator is trained around 1.4 to 2.0 throughout 92%
accuracy in classification as seen in Table 8. The generator however starts with high
loss as expected and eventually stabilizes to around 1.5 to 2.0, with one high loss value
at epoch 600. This is the most stable training we have seen among all the experiments
and this model is considered a stable one. In Figure 18, the generator loss averages in
the range 1.5 to 3.0 with odd spikes of upto 4.0. The discriminator losses are in the
range 1.5 to 2.0 with average accuracy of 85% as seen in Table 8. The discriminator
is stable while the generator losses are kept varying which tells us that additional
training is needed. However, the model has grasped enough information with 450
epochs to produce quality images as seen in Figure 20. Figure 19 shows a comparison
for ‘‘Yuner.A’’, and ‘‘VB.AT’’ families from MalImg data set and Figure 20 shows a
comparison between real and fake ‘‘Alureon’’, and ‘‘Zeroaccess’’ images from MalExe
data. We can observe that as the image size increases, their visual quality looks much
better and more similar to the original images.

Figure 19: Yuner.A (on top) and VB.AT (at bottom) from MalImg
An advantage of generating 128 × 128 is that we have big size images and these
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Figure 20: Alureon (on top) and Zeroaccess (at bottom) from MalExe
images can be used along with training data to train different deep learning models.
A disadvantage however is that since the image size is big, the time consumed to
train and process this model is high. This in turn results in requirements for faster
machines. However, compared to processing opcode, this is a more efficient approach,
and given enough processing power and time, generating 128 × 128 image through
AC-GAN would be ideal.
5.2

Evaluating quality of AC-GAN images
In this section, we experiment with different cases of real and fake data against

CNN and ELM. We treat the real set of images and the fake set of images as different
classes. For example, if we decide to test the MalImg data set with 10 classes, then
the CNN, ELM will be trained on 20 classes (10 original, 10 fake). With these images,
we train and test the accuracy of our CNN, ELM models. If the fake images are
realistic enough, then both these models should fail to identify the labels, which in
turn reduces their accuracy.

34

Table 9: MalExe CNN, ELM Accuracy
Image Size
32 × 32
32 × 32
64 × 64
64 × 64
128 × 128
128 × 128

Model
CNN
ELM
CNN
ELM
CNN
ELM

Parameters
3000 epochs
5000 units
3000 epochs
50,000 units
5000 epochs
20,000 units

Train accuracy
100%
100%
99%
-

Test accuracy
51.3%
48%
68%
79%
43%
52%

Table 10: MalImg CNN, ELM Accuracy
Image Size
32 × 32
32 × 32
64 × 64
64 × 64
128 × 128
128 × 128
5.2.1

Model
CNN
ELM
CNN
ELM
CNN
ELM

Parameters
3000 epochs
5000 units
3000 epochs
50,000 units
5000 epochs
20,000 units

Train accuracy
98.6%
100%
98.7%
-

Test accuracy
56.1%
37.2%
81.9%
64%
78%
56.39%

CNN and ELM on 64 × 64 set of data

In this experiment, we consider 64 × 64 images from 10 families of real data and
their fake data for both data sets, so we, therefore, have a total of 20 classes for each
data set. We consider 100 images for every class and with a total data count of 2000
images, which is divided into train and test data.
We first train CNN for 3000 epochs with a batch size of 500 as well as we pass
input to ELM with 50,000 hidden units. Table 10 shows the accuracy of CNN, ELM
obtained on MalImg test data. Figure 21 and Figure 22 shows the confusion matrix
for the same. We can see that, most of the classes are being classified, while some
are being misclassified. For family ‘‘Alureon.gen!J’’, we can see that they are being
misclassified to their fakes. Some images are getting misclassified as fakes, but some
families are being classified as other families. In both matrices, we can see that most
images are miss classified except for few families. The reason for classifying malware
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as a different family could be because the fake images generated by the generator for
one family are actually of a different family. AC-GAN can generate good images but
is not able to identify between classes. The accuracy achieved by the CNN on the
training set is 100%, yet the test accuracy drops to 81.9% and for ELM the accuracy
is about 64%. This further proves that the fake images are certainly causing concern
to CNN and ELM, but the fake images from different classes are overlapping.

Figure 21: CNN confusion matrix for MalImg
Figure 23 and Figure 24 represents the ‘‘Area under the Curve’’ (AUC-ROC
curve) for CNN and ELM. Both these graphs show that the classification for each
family is not ideal, but is nearing randomness. In Figure 24, we can see that for family
‘‘Agent.FYI fake’’, the graph plot is diagonal, which shows that the classification is
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Figure 22: ELM confusion matrix for MalImg
random. When trained on just the real images both CNN and ELM achieved an
accuracy of about 90% to 94%. This shows that the presence of fake images is causing
the CNN model to fail.
Table 9 shows the accuracy of CNN, ELM obtained on MalExe.We see that 100%
accuracy is achieved by CNN on the training set, while only 68% is achieved on test
data. ELM achieves a good 79% accuracy. Figure A.59 and Figure A.60 shows the
confusion matrix for CNN and ELM on MalExe. Lots of miss classification can be seen
in Figure A.59, which shows that CNN has failed, however, in Figure A.60, we can
see that since ELM could not perform better than CNN. Figure A.61 and Figure A.62
represent the AUC-ROC curve for these models, which further proves that CNN can
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Figure 23: CNN AUC-ROC curve for MalImg

Figure 24: ELM AUC-ROC curve for MalImg
classify most fakes, while ELM fails.
5.2.2

CNN and ELM on 32 × 32 set of data

Here, we consider 32 × 32 real and fake images from both MalImg and MalExe.
For MalExe, we consider all 18 classes, therefore we get a total of 36 classes. Therefore,
we have 3600 images. We train CNN for 3k epochs and ELM with 5000 hidden units.
Table 9 shows the accuracy of CNN and ELM obtained on MalExe. We can see that
the CNN accuracy drops to about 51.3% on the test data set while achieving 100%
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on the train data set, which shows that the images are same as the original and thus
CNN is getting confused during classification. ELM on the other hand achieves an
accuracy of 48%.

Figure 25: CNN confusion matrix for MalExe
Figure 25 and Figure 26 shows the confusion matrix for CNN and ELM on MalExe.
We can observe that for MalExe, more miss classification happens. Especially for the
‘‘cycbot fake’’ and ‘‘onlinegames fake’’, they are being miss classified to their originals.
This satisfies our intention. We can generate realistic images. However, this is not
happening in all families. For ELM the classification was about 48%, where a majority
of the classes are not correctly classified. Figure 27 and Figure 28 represents the
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Figure 26: ELM confusion matrix for MalExe
AUC-ROC curve for CNN and ELM. Looking at these graphs, we can easily conclude
that for ELM, there exist a lot of miss classification, while for CNN, the graphs are
much more accurate.
For MalImg, we consider all 25 classes, therefore we have 50 classes with 5000
images. CNN has trained for 3000 epochs and ELM with 5000 hidden units. Table 10
shows the accuracy of CNN and ELM obtained on MalImg. CNN performs well on
train data, but fails on test data with an accuracy of 56.1%, while ELM achieves
an accuracy of 37.2%. Figure A.63 and Figure A.64 shows the confusion matrix for
CNN, and ELM. Many families are being miss classified as fakes, but not to their
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Figure 27: CNN AUC-ROC curve for MalExe

Figure 28: ELM AUC-ROC curve for MalExe
respective fakes. Figure A.65 and Figure A.66 represents the ‘‘Area under the Curve’’
(AUC-ROC curve) for these models. From the plots, we can easily say that the model
performing at random, and is not able to predict between real and fake data. This is
what we were looking to achieve. However, this is not the case for all families. This
shows that our AC-GAN model has the potential to perform much better.
5.2.3

CNN and ELM on 128 × 128 set of data

In this experiment, we consider all families. We run experiments with CNN
for 5000 epochs and ELM with 20,000 hidden units. We treat real and fake images as
a separate set of classes.
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We consider MalExe data, with all 18 classes. Table 10 shows the accuracy of
CNN and ELM obtained on MalExe. 43% is achieved by CNN, and 52% accuracy
is achieved by ELM. Figure 29 and Figure 30 shows the confusion matrix for CNN
and ELM on MalExe. Similar to other experiments on MalExe, we can see a lot of
miss calculation for CNN, however for ELM, most classes are correctly classified, with
exception of class ‘‘alureon’’, and ‘‘zbot’’. These families are being miss classified to
their fakes. This again proves that AC-GAN is producing good images, but it still
has to learn to produce all variants present in the data set to completely fool models
like ELM. Figure 31 and Figure 32 represent the AUC-ROC curve, where we can see
these for CNN, that most families are in range 0.9 to 0.4.
For MalImg, we consider all classes. We train the CNN for 3000 epochs and ELM
with 20,000 hidden units. Table 10 shows the accuracy of CNN obtained on MalImg.
CNN achieves 78% accuracy, while ELM performs badly in this case and achieves
an accuracy of 56.39%. Figure A.67 and Figure A.68 shows the confusion matrix for
CNN and ELM. Similar observations are seen here, as in other experiments. Some
fakes are being misclassified as original, but not all fakes.Figure A.69 and Figure A.70
gives AUC-ROC curve for these models. A lot of variations can be seen here, for some
families where the range is below 0.5.
5.3

Discussion
From the experiments, we see that the images generated by the generator visually

look very realistic to the originals. Especially with MalImg, we see that the AC-GAN
is able to learn and generate good images. This is because of the small data set, which
enables us to train our model for longer times. For MalExe, only a few classes of
images look impressive. This might be due to the huge data set that AC-GAN has to
train through, which in turn resulted in compromising training time. This is mainly
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Figure 29: CNN confusion matrix for MalExe
due to the processing power constraints. The discriminator model in all cases for
MalImg achieved an average accuracy of about 90% to 92% during training, but in
the case of MalExe, we see that the accuracy is only about 80% to 89%. This shows
that the discriminator has trained well, but additional training is still required in the
case of MalExe.
Next, we evaluate the quality of these fake images. We observed that the CNN
can classify the training data accurately, yet it fails to classify images in the test
data set. Figure 33 shows the overall train and test accuracies for CNN. We see
here that the accuracy drops to around 40% to 80% in most cases on the test, while
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Figure 30: ELM confusion matrix for MalExe

Figure 31: CNN AUC-ROC curve for MalExe
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Figure 32: ELM AUC-ROC curve for MalExe
achieving 90% to 100% accuracy on training data. This shows how the CNN model
has trained well, but still not able to distinguish between real and fake data.

Figure 33: CNN train vs test accuracy for all experiments
If we consider the overall accuracies of all the experiments, as seen in Figure 34,
we can see that the performance of ELM is much better than CNN, especially with the
higher number of hidden units, the accuracy is around 55% to 79%. However, they
are not 100 percent accurate. AC-GAN on the other hand, achieves better accuracies
than these models even after encountering fake images. This shows that the fake
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Figure 34: Overall accuracy for all experiments
images generated are troubling both CNN and ELMs. The confusion matrix and the
accuracy graphs for these results also state that the model is not able to classify all
the images correctly. Thus, we can conclude that the quality of generated images
for both MalImg and MalExe is good. Some images are able to bypass deep learning
models like CNN, ELM. With more training, we expect these AC-GAN models to be
able to produce much higher quality images for all families.
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusion and Future Work
6.1

Conclusion
In this project, we wanted to perform malware generation. To reduce the

processing time of scanning and analyzing opcodes, we wanted to proceed with
treating malware as images. As GAN performs well with images, we chose to use
GAN with malware images. GAN is a generative adversarial network that contains
a generator and a discriminator. The generator generates fake images, while the
discriminator classifies them. These models try to outsmart each other and eventually
learn to generate realistic images. However, GAN generates random images.
On further research, we found that AC-GAN is a type of GAN that provides
additional control over the image we want to generate. Therefore, in this project, we
use AC-GAN for generation and then try to classify these fake images them using
CNN, ELM. Our main intention is to find good use cases for fake malware data.
To perform our experiments, we make use of two data sets namely ‘‘MalImg’’ that
contains 9k images belonging to 25 classes, and ‘‘MalExe’’ data set that contains 24k
belonging to 18 classes. However, the MalExe data set contains executable binaries
and hence we converted these binaries into images before beginning our experiments.
Since the data set is large, we divide the data into batches to perform classification.
Next, we implemented the AC-GAN model using Python, PyTorch, and keras
library. The experiments were run ‘‘Google Colab Pro’’, with maximum available
GPU run time. Using this model we generated fake malware images as well as analyzed
the training performance of both models. We observed that good training stability on
MalImg and partial stability on MalExe, which mainly was due to differences in their
training epochs.
Further, we generated images of three different sizes namely: 32 × 32, 64 × 64,
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128 × 128. We plotted graphs to analyze their training, we generated fake images and
compared them with original ones. We found that in most cases, images look similar
to the original ones. We also classify and calculate accuracies of discriminator during
training. During each epoch, we predict class labels and validity labels on the test
data set. We calculate accuracy for every batch and average the values.
To check the quality of the images, we also trained and tested out CNN and
ELM models on different sizes of real and fake malware images. We saw that CNN
fails in almost all experiments, even though the training accuracy is 100%. ELM on
the other hand performs better than CNN and achieves the best accuracy of 70%. We
plotted confusion matrices, AUC-ROC graphs and discussed the classification results.
We saw that most images were being miss classified to a different family which was
not the case when fake images were not present. Thus we can say that the presence
of fake images is causing these models to fail. For certain families such as ‘‘rbot’’ and
‘‘onlinegames’’, the fake images are being classified as the original. This shows that
the AC-GAN is learning to generate realistic images, but certainly, additional training
is required as this is not the case for all families.
Our idea was that if the fake images are realistic as the original image, then our
CNN and ELM models should fail to correctly classify them even after training. This
is exactly what we observed throughout our experiments. The CNN failed with an
average accuracy of about 40% to 80%, while and ELM accuracies were only about 37%
to 78%. The accuracy achieved by the AC-GAN discriminator model is better than
the performance of CNN, ELMs. Thus, we can conclude we were successfully able to
generate realistic fake malware images. However, further research and experiments
are still required to improve the quality of the images.
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6.2

Future Work
Finally, we look at some of the things that can be done in the future to add to

this research. The first that could be done is training this model for a long time on
these data sets. This would require a lot of computing power, and hence this project
could be run on a cloud platform, and the new results could be really interesting.
Another idea could be to reduce more computation and processing time, which can be
achieved by considering images as 1D vector. Also, by considering images as a 1D
vector, we need not remove nor add any bytes to malware binaries. We can also
look at implementing different versions of GAN such as: ‘‘Super-Resolution GAN
(SR-GAN)’’ to develop high resolution images and Unbiased AC-GAN that is proven
to perform better than AC-GAN.
Finally, we can say that the experiments were done in this project yield good
results, and additional work will enhance this research to produce ground-breaking
results in the future.
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APPENDIX A

A.1

Results from AC-GAN
MalImg data set images.

Figure A.35: MalImg data set images of 10 classes
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Figure A.36: MalImg data set images of 6 classes
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Figure A.37: MalImg data set images of 6 classes
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A.2

MalExe data set images.

Figure A.38: MalExe data set images 9 classes
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Figure A.39: MalExe data set images 9 classes
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A.3

Fake vs real images for MalImg.

Figure A.40: MalImg fake vs real data 1

Figure A.41: MalImg fake vs real data 2
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Figure A.42: MalImg fake vs real data 3

Figure A.43: MalImg fake vs real data 4

Figure A.44: MalImg fake vs real data 5
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Figure A.45: MalImg fake vs real data 6

Figure A.46: MalImg fake vs real data 7

Figure A.47: MalImg fake vs real data 8
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Figure A.48: MalImg fake vs real data 9
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A.4

Fake vs real images for MalExe.

Figure A.49: MalExe fake vs real data 1

Figure A.50: MalExe fake vs real data 2
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Figure A.51: MalExe fake vs real data 3

Figure A.52: MalExe fake vs real data 4

Figure A.53: MalExe fake vs real data 5
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Figure A.54: MalExe fake vs real data 6

Figure A.55: MalExe fake vs real data 7

Figure A.56: MalExe fake vs real data 8
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Figure A.57: MalExe fake vs real data 9

Figure A.58: MalExe fake vs real data 10
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A.5

Confusion matrices for CNN on MalExe 64 × 64.

Figure A.59: CNN confusion matrix for MalExe
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A.6

Confusion matrices for ELM on MalExe 64 × 64.

Figure A.60: ELM confusion matrix for MalExe
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A.7

AUC-ROC graphs for CNN on MalExe 64 × 64.

Figure A.61: CNN AUC-ROC curve for Malexe
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A.8

AUC-ROC graphs for ELM on MalExe 64 × 64.

Figure A.62: ELM AUC-ROC curve for MalExe
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A.9

Confusion matrices for CNN on MalImg 32 × 32.

Figure A.63: CNN confusion matrix for MalImg

73

A.10

Confusion matrices for ELM on MalImg 32 × 32.

Figure A.64: ELM confusion matrix for MalImg
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A.11

AUC-ROC graphs for CNN on MalImg 32 × 32.

Figure A.65: CNN AUC-ROC curve for MalImg
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A.12

AUC-ROC graphs for ELM on MalImg 32 × 32.

Figure A.66: ELM AUC-ROC curve for MalImg

76

A.13

Confusion matrices for CNN on MalImg 128 × 128.

Figure A.67: CNN confusion matrix for MalImg
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A.14

Confusion matrices for ELM on MalImg 128 × 128.

Figure A.68: ELM confusion matrix for MalImg
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A.15

AUC-ROC graphs for CNN on MalImg 128 × 128.

Figure A.69: CNN AUC-ROC curve for MalImg
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A.16

AUC-ROC graphs for ELM on MalImg 128 × 128.

Figure A.70: ELM AUC-ROC curve for MalImg
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APPENDIX B
Additional Experiments and Results
In this section, we perform additional experiments to evaluate the quality of the
fake images. We run CNN and ELM on both datasets (MalImg and MalExe) for all
sizes (32 × 32, 64 × 64, 128 × 128). Here we consider all real images as one set of class
and all fake images as another class. Therefore, for all our experiments we will have
only 2 classes (Real and Fake).
B.1 Experiments with CNN
B.1.1 For 32 × 32 images
First, we perform CNN experiments with 32 × 32 images. We keep batch size
to 100, and run all experiments for 500 epochs. The confusion matrix obtained for
MalImg data set can be seen in Figure B.71. We see here that all the fakes are
classified correctly, however we also see here that only 50% of the real images are
classifies correctly and the others are being considered to fake. Even in this case
the training accuracy is 100%, while the test accuracy is 63.9%. The AUC-ROC
curve for this confusion matrix can be seen in Figure B.73. Similarly observations
are seen across all the experiments. For Malexe data set, we see that the accuracy
drops to 53%. The confusion matrix and the AUC curves can seen in Figure B.72 and
Figure B.74 respectively.
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Figure B.71: Confusion Matrix for 32 × 32 MalImg data
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Figure B.72: Confusion Matrix for 32 × 32 MalExe data

Figure B.73: AUC-ROC curve for 32 × 32 MalImg data
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Figure B.74: AUC-ROC curve for 32 × 32 MalExe data
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B.1.2

For 64 × 64 images

Next we perform the experiments on 64 × 64 images. Here, we see that the
accuracy obtained for MalImg is about 83% for MalImg and 71.52% for MalExe. Here,
the CNN is able to classify majority of the malware images for MalImg, while struggling
against MalExe. Overall the accuracies are slightly better in these experiments than
in the experiments for 32 × 32 images. The confusion matrix and AUC curves for
MalImg data set can be seen in Figure B.75 and Figure B.77. And the confusion
matrix and the AUC curves can seen in Figure B.76 and Figure B.78 respectively.

Figure B.75: Confusion Matrix for 64 × 64 MalImg data
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Figure B.76: Confusion Matrix for 64 × 64 MalExe data

Figure B.77: AUC-ROC curve for 64 × 64 MalImg data
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Figure B.78: AUC-ROC curve for 64 × 64 MalExe data
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B.1.3

For 128 × 128 images

Finally, we perform CNN experiments with 128 × 128 images. In this case we see
that the accuracy for MalImg reaches 73% and for MalExe, it is 68%. Here again the
accuracies drop and this further shows that the presence of fake images are causing
problems to CNN. The confusion matrix obtained for MalImg data set can be seen
in Figure B.79, where about 30% miss-classification can be seen and the AUC curve
for the same is shown in Figure B.81. Similarly the results in confusion matrix for
MalExe is almost similar and can seen in Figure B.80 and the AUC curves for MalExe
is shown in Figure B.82.

Figure B.79: Confusion Matrix for 128 × 128 MalImg data
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Figure B.80: Confusion Matrix for 128 × 128 MalExe data

Figure B.81: AUC-ROC curve for 128 × 128 MalImg data
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Figure B.82: AUC-ROC curve for 128 × 128 MalExe data
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B.2 Experiments with ELM
B.2.1 For 32 × 32 images
In these experiments first, we test ELM with 32 × 32 images. We keep the hidden
nodes to 5000 throughout. We see here that all the fakes are classified correctly,
however we additionally see here that half of the real images are classified correctly
and the other half are misclassified. Even in this case the training accuracy is 100%,
while the test accuracy is 88%. The confusion matrix obtained for MalImg data set
can be seen in Figure B.83. The AUC-ROC curve for this confusion matrix can be
seen in Figure B.85. In case of MalExe data set, we see that the accuracy drops
to 57%. In the confusion matrix and the AUC curves can seen in Figure B.84 and
Figure B.86 respectively, we see that there are a lot miss-classification for real images.
They are being confused to a fake. This further proves that fake images are troubling
even ELMs.
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Figure B.83: Confusion Matrix for 32 × 32 MalImg data
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Figure B.84: Confusion Matrix for 32 × 32 MalExe data

Figure B.85: AUC-ROC curve for 32 × 32 MalImg data
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Figure B.86: AUC-ROC curve for 32 × 32 MalExe data
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B.2.2

For 64 × 64 images

Next we perform the experiments on 64 × 64 images. Here, we see that the
accuracy obtained for MalImg is about 52% for MalImg and 86% for MalExe. Here,
the ELM is able to classify majority of the malware images for MalExe, while struggling
against MalImg. Overall the accuracies are better for MalExe. The AUC curve is
almost at the diagonal for MalExe experiment, which shows that prediction is pretty
much like guessing. The confusion matrix and AUC curves for MalImg data set can
be seen in Figure B.87 and Figure B.89. And the confusion matrix and the AUC
curves can seen in Figure B.88 and Figure B.90 respectively.

Figure B.87: Confusion Matrix for 64 × 64 MalImg data
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Figure B.88: Confusion Matrix for 64 × 64 MalExe data

Figure B.89: AUC-ROC curve for 64 × 64 MalImg data
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Figure B.90: AUC-ROC curve for 64 × 64 MalExe data
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B.2.3

For 128 × 128 images

Finally, we perform ELM experiments with 128 × 128 images. Here, we see that
the accuracy for MalImg reaches 68% and for MalExe, it is 76%. Here again we see
accuracy drops for MalImg. This further shows that the presence of fake images are
causing problems to ELM. The confusion matrix obtained for MalImg data set can be
seen in Figure B.79 and AUC curve for the same is shown in Figure B.80. Similarly
the confusion matrix and the AUC curves for MalExe is represented in Figure B.81
and Figure B.82 respectively.

Figure B.91: Confusion Matrix for 128 × 128 MalImg data
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Figure B.92: Confusion Matrix for 128 × 128 MalExe data

Figure B.93: AUC-ROC curve for 128 × 128 MalImg data
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Figure B.94: AUC-ROC curve for 128 × 128 MalExe data
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B.2.4

Discussion

From these experiments, we see that the accuracies remain similar as other
experiments performed in this project. Even when considering only two classes of
data, we see that both CNN and ELM are failing to achieve good accuracies that
were previously observed without the fake images. The comparison of the accuracies
for CNN and ELM can be seen in the Figure B.95 below. From the graphs we can

Figure B.95: Overall CNN and ELM accuracies
see that in some cases ELM achieves accuracies ranging from 52% to 88%, while for
CNN the accuracies are about 53% to 83%. Compared to multi classification CNN
and ELMs, the accuracies in these experiments have improved slightly. This may be
due to the less number of classes. However, the accuracies is not as desired. For a
good deep learning model, we expect accuracies of about 95% to 100%. Therefore, we
can conclude that both CNN and ELM are resulting in miss-classification and this is
surely due to the presence of fake malware samples.
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